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Abstract 
The limitations of formal administrative controls in organizations performing complex production tasks have 
created the need for less obtrusive forms of management control. When formal administrative controls cannot 
cater to the unpredictability of complex work demands, one strategy is to employ “professionals” who have 
been trained to cope with these demands and whose behaviour is primarily controlled through social and 
self-control mechanisms. There is some question, however, as to the effectiveness of this strategy. There is 
evidence that integrating pmfessionals into bureaucratic organizations creates the potential for a “clash of 
cultures”. Conflict emerges when salaried professionals engage in behaviour directed towards increasing 
their own autonomy (or in some cases maintaining it) and management implement control systems designed 
to control that bebaviour. This paper argues that the degree of conflict experienced will depend on the 
individual role orientation of the professional and the extent to which management confront professionals 
with bureaucratic administrative systems which restricf their self-regulatory activities. The study was 
undertaken in a large public teaching hospital in Australia and the results support the theoretical position 
taken in the paper. 
Accountants concerned with the management processes which operate within organizations 
of complex organizations need a “wider vision” (Hopwood, 1976). Nowhere is this more 
of control and an understanding of the interplay important than in human service organizations 
between the administrative controls they often where core production activities are dominated 
design and implement, and the informal cdntrol by professionals. ’ Professionals are employed in 
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’ There has been considerable debate in the sociology literature as to the traits of a professional and the social and political 
factors which influence the development of a profession (see Abbott, 1988; Davies, 1983; Barley & Tolbert, 1991). Leading 
sociologists studying professionals recognize the futility of finding any widely accepted definition of the term professional 
and argue that it is important for “writers on the topic to display to readers what they have in mind when the word 
is used _” (Freidson, 1983, p. 35). Following others, the term “professional” is used in this study to refer to a group of 
workers (e.g. nurses, doctors, lawyers, academics, etc.) who, by virtue of their knowledge and expertise, are employed 
to perform complex production tasks and thus are treated difTerently (or expect to be treated differently) from other 
workers as well as from management (Barley & Tolbert, 1991; Derber & Schwartz, 199 1). 
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these settings to accomplish complex tasks for 
which formal administrative controls are poorly 
suited (Zucker, 1991). These individuals have 
been trained to perform complex tasks indepen- 
dently and to solve problems which arise in the 
performance of these tasks using their experience 
and expertise (Derber & Schwartz, 1991). They 
are socialized according to a model of control 
which emphasizes social and self-controls. There 
is, however, the potential for a “clash of cultures” 
when professionals are incorporated into bureau- 
cratic organizations (Raelin, 1989). When core 
production processes become dependent on the 
expertise of professionals, these individuals 
often gain considerable autonomy within the 
organization. This autonomy becomes problem- 
atic when professionals demand, and often 
achieve, control not only over the process of 
the work but also over the purposes or ends of 
the work (Barley & Tolbert, 1991; Derber & 
Schwartz, 1991). Organizations are reluctant to 
grant professionals these special rights as they 
are likely to conflict with management goals and 
bureaucratic principles of management. 
Accounting systems are implicated in the 
relationship between professionals and organ- 
izations as these systems are designed and 
implemented to achieve bureaucratic criteria of 
efficiency and accountability. They are often 
implemented with little concern for the unique 
aspects of the delivery of professional services. 
An illustration of this is taking place in the 
hospital sector where cost containment efforts 
are increasing the pressure for the implementa- 
tion of new and sophisticated management 
control systems (Preston et al., 1992). An 
implicit objective of these policy initiatives is 
to increase control over the behaviour of the 
professionals who have traditionally dominated 
decision making in hospitals (Chua & Degeling, 
199 1). While this dominance is seen as adverse 
to the efficient and effective delivery of health 
care services, increased levels of bureaucratic 
control may not be the panacea. Hospitals run 
the risk of becoming trapped in what Crozier 
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(1964, p. 187) refers to as a “bureaucratic 
vicious circle”. As these organizations attempt 
to impose administrative controls on pro- 
fessionals, this provokes a new effort on the part 
of professionals to evade these controls, which 
is then countered by a new round of standardiz- 
ing regulations, and so on until the organization 
“becomes frozen into a completely intlexible 
structure” (Young & Saltman, 1985, p. 36). Not 
only does this behaviour threaten organizational 
survival, it also has adverse effects on the 
professionals associated with these organiza- 
tions (Copur, 1990). 
There is very little research in the accounting 
literature studying control systems in profession- 
ally dominated organizations despite the rapid 
shift of professionals from self-employed to 
salaried employment.2 The few studies which 
do exist have tended to be based on socio- 
economic and political frameworks (Broadbent 
et al., 1991; Chua & Degeling, 1993; Preston et 
al., 1992). This paper adopts a much more 
functionalist perspective and examines the 
implications when formal administrative controls, 
such as accounting controls, are implemented in 
organizations dominated by professionals. We 
are particularly interested in the conditions 
which influence the extent to which this form 
of control will lead to adverse consequences. 
The paper reports on a study undertaken in one 
large teaching hospital in Melbourne, Australia, 
using a sample of nurse and physician managers. 
The focus on the hospital sector reduces the 
risk of overgeneralization (see Ginsberg, 1988) 
and yet enables a study of control in what is 
considered to be a highly complex industry 
(Perrow, 1986; Shortell et al, 1990). The study 
is particularly relevant to managers in this sector 
as significant resources are currently being 
devoted to the development of management 
accounting systems and there is some question 
as to the efficacy of these systems (Abernethy & 
Stoelwinder, 199 1; Poll&t et al., 19sS, Packwood 
et al., 1991; Preston et al., 1992). 
The paper is organized as follows. The 
2 Nearly three-quarters of all professionals are now employed in organizations (Copur, 1990) 
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following section develops the conceptual 
framework resulting in testable hypotheses. 
Subsequent sections describe the method, pre- 
sent the results and discuss the implications of 
the findings. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Prior literature 
In much of the early research the concept of 
organization control was perceived as an admini- 
strative process “designed to regulate the 
activities of organization participants and, by 
implication, output” (Mills, 1983, p. 445). As a 
consequence, much of our understanding of 
management control systems has come from 
investigating mechanisms which are imple- 
mented by senior management to control work 
through observing and monitoring behaviour 
and the outputs which result from that behaviour 
(Merchant, 1985; Birnberg & Snodgrass, 1988). 
These control mechanisms have often been 
termed administrative or bureaucratic controls 
and include such mechanisms and procedures 
as authority structures, rules, policies, standard 
operating procedures, budgets, reward and 
incentive systems (Hopwood, 1976; Hellriegel 
& Slocum, 1986). Numerous models of control 
have been developed and tested in both the 
organization behaviour and accounting litera- 
tures which indicate that as production processes 
become increasingly complex and unpredictable, 
traditional administrative controls have been 
found wanting (Hirst, 1983; Merchant, 1985). 
It is in this situation where organizations often 
resort to what Orlikowsky ( 199 1, p. 11) refers 
to as “professional control”. 
Professional control is similar to Ouchi’s 
(1979) notion of clan control in that it is based 
on social and self-control processes. It occurs 
when the organization hires personnel who 
are equipped with coping mechanisms which 
enable them to apply their expertise in condi- 
tions of uncertainty (Perrow, 1986). These 
individuals are seen to have not only the 
necessary knowledge and experience to per- 
form complex tasks, but they have also been 
socialized to act independently without formal 
administrative controls, and can search for and 
implement desired solutions. It is expected that 
professional behaviour will be controlled through 
self-control processes and the social controls 
imposed by individuals within the professional 
group (Orlikowsky, 1991). Most of the control 
literature has argued that these less formal 
controls are desirable when bureaucratic forms 
of control cannot cater to the unpredictability 
of complex work demands and tended to 
ignore the potential for dysfunctional behaviour 
(Merchant, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). It is assumed 
that social and self-controls are functional 
because they are supplemented by training and 
socialization strategies implemented by manage- 
ment to instil and reinforce congruence between 
the goals and values of individuals and those 
espoused by the organization. These strategies 
are designed to facilitate the acceptance of 
bureaucratic norms and values. This, in turn, 
enables the organization to trust individuals to 
behave in a way which is consistent with the 
achievement of organizational objectives (Ouchi, 
1979). 
Professional control, however, is an external 
form of control as it has “its roots outside the 
organization” and stems from the social control 
imposed by individuals within the professional 
group (Orlikowsky, 1991, p. 11). Internal 
socialization policies, therefore, will not neces- 
sarily be effective in ensuring that organizational 
values and norms are internalized. This is 
particularly evident in organizations such as 
hospitals and universities where the profession 
often remains the dominant socialization agent 
(Derber & Schwartz, 1991; Lurie, 1981). There 
is no option in these organizations but to rely 
on professional modes of control as professionals 
have traditionally controlled core production 
processes (Mintzberg, 1979). In addition, hos- 
pitals and universities are generally structured 
on a not-for-profit basis and hence their charters 
preclude provision of incentives to reinforce 
organizational values. There is, therefore, some 
concern as to the effectiveness of professional 
control. This concern has taken two directions. 
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One has been to question the notion that 
professionals can be trusted to serve the public 
good. Johnson (1977) and Freidson (1970, 
1975) both exemplify this more sceptical view 
of professionals and demonstrate how ditTerent 
groups of professionals have exploited their 
expertise in organizations to achieve the neces- 
sary dominance and authority to pursue activities 
which satisfy their own goals and objectives 
rather than those of the organization. 
A second line of inquiry stems from the 
literature which has focused on the conflict 
experienced by professionals when they become 
salaried employees and confront the values and 
norms which underlie bureaucratic organiza- 
tions (Hall, 1967; Scott, 1966; Raelin, 1989; 
Copur, 1990). The literature, based on this 
sociological paradigm, views the model of 
control which underlies professional behaviour 
as antithetical to the control model that 
underlies bureaucratic organizations (Scott, 
1966). Considerable research has been devoted 
to studying the sociological problems which 
arise when professionals are integrated into 
bureaucratic organizations3 This research almost 
invariably assumes that sole practice is the proper 
form of employment for professionals and that 
inserting professionals into bureaucratic organ- 
izations will inevitably result in conflict (Barley 
& Tolbert, 1991; Davies, 1983). Copur (1990, 
p. 114) summarizes the differences in the two 
institutional forms of organizing work which are 
seen to give rise to professional/bureaucratic 
conflict: 
Bureaucratic tasks are partial and training is short and 
within the organization, while professional jobs are 
complete and training takes long years outside the 
organization. Bureaucrats are loyal to the organization 
and legitimate their acts by invoking organizational rules 
while professionalism requires loyalty to the profession 
and legitimizing of action based on technical competence. 
In bureaucracies, compliance is supervised by hierarchi- 
cal superiors. As a contrast, professional compliance is 
3 See Abbott ( 1988) for a review of this literature. 
elicited through socialization and internalization of 
ethical norms set by a community of peers. 
The assumption that the relationship between 
professionals and bureaucratic organizations is 
necessarily conflictual has been challenged 
(Davies, 1983; Barley & Tolbert, 1991). Barley 
and Tolbert ( 1991), however, argue that the 
notion of professional/bureaucratic conflict 
should not be discarded but rather that it be 
viewed as an empirical question instead of an 
ideology - that is, conflict be seen as one of 
degree rather than as an absolute. What is 
becoming of interest to researchers studying 
behaviour in professionally dominated organiza- 
tions is a specification of the conditions which 
give rise to conflict and the structural and other 
control arrangements required for accommo- 
dating professional demands for autonomy and 
management’s desire to impose formal admini- 
strative controls to achieve bureaucratic criteria 
of efficiency and accountability (Derber & Schwartz, 
1991; Sitkin & Sutcliffe, 1991; Tolbert & Stern, 
199 1). This study follows this line of inquiry. In 
particular, the study is concerned with assessing 
the extent of conflict experienced when man- 
agement control systems are implemented into 
professionally dominated organizations and the 
factors which influence the degree of conflict 
(if any) experienced by professionals. The 
hypothesis to be tested is developed as follows. 
Designing management control systems in 
professional bureaucracies4 
Role theory tells us that individuals experience 
contlict when there is “. . the simultaneous 
occurrence of two (or more) sets of pressures 
such that compliance with one would make 
difficult or impossible compliance with the 
other” (Wolfe & Snoke, 1962, p. 103). The 
potential for role conflict to emerge when 
professionals become integrated into bureau- 
cratic organizations will depend on the extent 
’ Mintzberg (1979) used the term “professional bureaucracy” to refer to organizations, such as hospitals and universities, 
which rely on the skills and knowledge of their professionals to perform core operating activities. 
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to which there are fundamental differences in 
the two models of behaviour. As noted earlier, 
however, role conflict is not inevitable as neither 
professionals nor bureaucracies exhibit all the 
distingmshing characteristics described above 
by Copur (1990). Two factors, likely to in- 
fluence the extent of conflict experienced by 
professionals, are explored here. 
The first is the extent to which a professional, 
once employed in an organization, maintains a 
high professional orientation or shifts their 
orientation towards the values and norms of the 
organization (Miller & Wager, 1971). A person 
with a high professional orientation is one who 
primarily identifies with their professional group, 
is committed to developing and retaining the 
power and prestige of the profession, develops 
the abstract knowledge system, and looks to 
professional colleagues, both within and outside 
the organization, for support (Miller & Wager, 
1971; Abbott, 1988). It is this focus on the 
profession itself with its own code of ethics and 
models of conduct which is a distinctive 
characteristic of professionals (Abbott, 1988). 
While some professional groups, such as physi- 
cians, lawyers, academics, are often represented 
as those with a high professional orientation, 
there is increasing evidence that there are 
considerable variations in individual role orien- 
tations both within and between professional 
groupings (Aranya & Ferris, 1984; Hall, 1967; 
Copur, 1990). 
An individual’s professional orientation is 
likely to vary depending on the extent to which 
a professional is prepared to give up some of 
the expectations of the role to which they were 
socialized in order to function as an employee 
(Lurie, 1981). As argued earlier, management 
deliberately implement socialization strategies 
to increase an individual’s commitment to the 
goals and value system of the organization. 
These strategies can act as a very powerful 
socialization agent and influence an individuals 
professional orientation once employed in an 
organization (Ouchi, 1979). If the work setting 
is the more powerful socialization agent, then 
role incompatibility is unlikely to emerge. 
Goode ( 1969) argued that compatibility between 
organizational and professional norms and 
values is likely to occur to a greater extent 
with “technical-scientific” professionals (e.g. 
accounting, engineering) than with “person” 
professionals (law, medicine, university teach- 
ing). This suggests that some groups of profes- 
sionals are more prepared than others to 
accommodate the need of bureaucracies 
by relinquishing some of their professional 
autonomy. Recent research, however, demon- 
strates that this is more likely to be due to 
historical and/or political and economic forces 
rather than to some unique characteristic of 
an occupational group. These forces influence 
the relative power of organizations to success- 
fully bureaucratize professionals (Davies, 1983; 
Freidson, 1983; Barley & Tolbert, 1991).5 
Regardless of the factors which influence 
the organization’s ability to socialize salaried 
employees, the apparent compatibility between 
professionals and bureaucracies is supportive 
of the notion that if individuals are able to give 
up some of the expectations associated with a 
high professional orientation, conflict can be 
minimized as they are able to accommodate 
the organization’s concerns for efficiency and 
accountability (Aranya & Ferris, 1984; Sitkin & 
Sutcliffe, 199 1; Derber & Schwartz, 199 1). 
For some salaried professionals the primary 
and most powerful socialization agent will 
continue to be the profession. Professional 
groups have been able to remain the dominant 
socialization agent (or have gained dominances) 
within an organization” because of the power 
5 Bacharach et al. ( 1991) note that these forces will shift over time and thus the characteristics of professionals and their 
relationship with the organization are not likely to remain static. 
6 The authority and power of professional groups within an organization can be at different stages of development. For 
example, physician authority in hospitals has been legitimized for many years and this group of professionals is currently 
concerned with maintaining that authority. Nursing, on the other hand, has traditionally not enjoyed such authority and 
is only relatively recently engaging in activities to develop professional autonomy (Fourcher & Howard, 1981). 
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and autonomy gained for members of the 
profession either by controlling the knowledge 
system or through industrial action (Abbott, 
1988; Lurie, 1981; Friedson, 1975). A high 
professional orientation is, therefore, likely to 
be indicative of an individual’s desire to achieve 
(or maintain) their autonomy in the work 
setting (Freidson, 1975). It follows that those 
individuals who demonstrate high levels of 
professional orientation will experience conllict 
in a bureaucratic organization as they will 
perceive management-related goals and obliga- 
tions as contrary to their pursuit of autonomy. 
A high professional orientation, however, 
does not necessarily lead to role conflict. The 
second factor which influences the degree of 
conflict experienced by salaried professionals is 
the extent to which their autonomy to operate 
independently is threatened by a requirement 
to adhere to administrative controls which 
are based on values and norms which are not 
in harmony with those of the professional 
(Freidson, 1970). Just as individual role orienta- 
tions will differ so will the extent to which an 
organization (or subunit of an organization) 
attempts to impose tight administrative con- 
trols. As noted by Barley & Tolbert ( 1991, p. 10) 
this is likely to be influenced by the organiza- 
tion’s need for continuous access to specialized 
expertise as well as the extent to which 
professional groups, or individual professionals, 
come to dominate organization decision making 
once they have “established a foothold inside 
the organization’s boundaries. . .” It is also likely 
to be influenced by economic and political 
factors (Hopwood, 1984). 
Administrative controls include both output 
and behaviour controls. Behaviour controls, 
such as the use ofsupervision, attempt to control 
behaviour by specifying behaviour which will 
lead to achievement of desired objectives and 
then observing if individuals behave in this 
manner. Financial controls such as budgeting 
are illustrative of output controls. Budgets 
operate as an output control by setting targets 
and measuring the extent to which the individual 
achieves these targets. A high professional 
orientation, with its emphasis on professional 
values and norms, is likely to be incompatible 
with a control environment dominated by 
administrative forms of control as these threaten 
professional autonomy. An environment which 
allows individuals with a high professional 
orientation to operative unencumbered by 
formal administrative controls is likely to reduce 
the potential for conllict. Thus, it is expected 
that imposing administrative controls which 
attempt to either control individual behaviour 
by specifying desired actions or achieve desired 
behaviour by specifying targets and measuring 
performance, is likely to have adverse organ- 
izational consequences where individuals have 
a high professional orientation. The confluence 
of a high professional orientation and a bureau- 
cratic control environment will cause the 
emergence of role conflict. In contrast, if an 
individual with a high professional orientation 
is working in an environment where he/she is 
expected to rely on self-control or the social 
controls imposed by peers, we expect role 
conflict will be minimized. 
Hypothesis I 
In summary, we expect the interation between 
an individual’s professional orientation and their 
control environment to have a significant impact 
on role conflict. We hypothesize that role 
conflict will be reduced where there is a match 
between professional orientation and the organ- 
ization’s control environment. Role conlIict is 
used in the analytical model as the dependent 
variable. The hypothesis to be tested is stated 
as follows (in null form): 
H, There will be no significant interaction between 
professional orientation and the type of control environ- 
ment affecting role conflict. 
Role conflict and organizational 
effectiveness-Hypothesis II 
Since Otley’s ( 1980) review of the manage- 
ment accounting literature there has been an 
increasing demand for the inclusion of an 
effectiveness criterion variable in models of the 
type assessed in this study. While a match 
between the control environment and the 
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individual’s professional orientation is argued to 
impact on role conflict, the important question 
is whether this conBict has any adverse organ- 
izational effects. As noted earlier, management 
is often reluctant to accord professionals auto- 
nomy as there is a potential threat to the achieve- 
ment of organizational objectives. Hospitals, in 
particular, have often been viewed by economists 
and sociologists as “simply inert turf upon which 
numerous individuals seek to maximize their 
own separate advantage” (Young & Saltman, 
1985, p. 22). It is, therefore, important to 
establish the link between role conIlict and 
organizational outcomes. 
There is considerable support in the psycho- 
logy literature that role conflict has adverse 
organizational consequences. Kahn et al. ( 1964) 
and others have reported numerous dysfunc- 
tional consequences of role conflict such as 
increases in job-related tension and turnover as 
well as decreases in job satisfaction, organ- 
izational commitment and overall performance 
(see Jackson & Schuler, 1985, for a review of 
this literature). 
To provide some evidence as to the likely 
impact of role conflict on organizational out- 
comes, two variables, used in prior literature - 
namely, job satisfaction and subunit performance 
- are examined (Hirst, 1983; Brownell & Dunk, 
199 1; Chenhall & Brownell, 1988; Abernethy & 
Stoelwinder, 199 1). It is expected that increases 
in role conflict will have a negative impact on 
both job satisfaction and subunit performance. 
The following hypothesis (stated in null form) 
is tested: 
Hz There is no significant relationship between role 
conflict and either job satisfaction or subunit performance. 
METHOD 
Sample 
A questionnaire was administered to 100 
physician and nurse subunit managers in a large 
hospital in Australia. This setting was particularly 
well suited to studying the way in which account- 
ing is implicated in the relationship between 
professionals and organizations, as it has been very 
proactive in the development and implementa- 
tion of sophisticated accounting control systems 
(Stoelwinder & Abernethy, 1989). It is a teaching 
and research hospital with university medical and 
nursing school affiliations. Data collection was 
limited to nurse and physician managers to 
control for variables related to task and function. 
Both these groups are involved in teaching, 
research and patient care.’ All of the respondents 
were in middle management positions and 
performed both managerial and core operating 
tasks and it is in this situation where role conflict 
is most likely to emerge, as professionals in these 
positions are unable to avoid confronting the 
formal administrative control system (Sorensen & 
Sorensen, 1974). Thus, variation on this con- 
struct was expected. A total of 91 usable ques- 
tionnaires were returned yielding a response 
rate of 91 per cent. 
The following variables were measured: pro- 
fessional orientation, control environment, role 
conflict, subunit performance and job satisfac- 
tion. Prior to the administration of the question- 
naire, the measurement instruments used for 
each of these variables were tested on a “hold- 
out” sample of nurse and physician managers. 
Any ambiguity in the wording of the items was 
removed in the final instrument. Each of the 
variables is discussed in turn. 
‘While physicians have typically been seen to have a monopoly on the research function in hospitals, the change to 
baccalaureate training for nurses has increased the research component of nurse education. Hospitals are also actively 
encouraging the involvement of nursing in research. For example, in the research site while the data were collected there 
was a nursing research officer to co-ordinate nursing research. 
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The independent variables 
Professional orientation. Few studies have 
attempted to measure professional orientation. 
A number of measures were considered.* The 
instrument selected to measure professional 
orientation was one developed by Miller & 
Wagner ( 1971) and Davis ( 1961). The instru- 
ment is not meant to capture professional 
behaviour, as such, but rather act as a proxy for 
the values which are perceived to be associated 
with a professional orientation (as opposed to 
a managerial or bureaucratic orientation), as 
defined in this study. This measure, therefore, 
focuses on the pursuit of academic knowledge 
which is argued to be the means by which a 
professional gains and maintains autonomy 
(Abbott, 1988). The instrument included the 
following five items: 
( 1) It is important to me that I be able to 
publish the results of my work in professional 
journals. 
(2) It is important to me that I be able to 
pursue and carry out my own research ideas. 
(3) Being able to do the kind of research that 
will contribute to the standing of my profession 
is very important to me. 
(4) In the long run I would rather be 
respected (a) among specialists in my field 
outside the hospital or (b) in the hospital where 
I work. 
(5) In the near future, I would most like (a) 
to publish a paper in the leading journal in my 
profession even though the topic may be of 
minor interest to the hospital, or (b) to make a 
major contribution to one of the hospital’s 
projects. 
With the exception of the last two items, the 
items were in a seven-point, fully anchored 
Likert-scale form. For the last two items respon- 
dents were required to choose either (a) or (b). 
To ensure that these items were weighted 
consistently with the Iirst three items, they were 
coded using the inter-quartile points of the 
seven-point scale. The scores on the five items 
were then summed for use in the analysis. An 
alpha coefficient of 0.79 provides support for 
the internal reliability of the measure.9 
Other data collected in this study provide 
some support for the construct validity of this 
measure. Recall that a professional orientation 
reflects the characteristics that may be per- 
ceived to be important to developing and 
maintaining the prestige of the profession, as 
opposed to the norms and values which are 
important to the functioning of bureaucratic 
organizations. Abernethy & Stoelwinder ( 199 1) 
measured bureaucratic values and norms using a 
construct based on Perrow’s ( 1968) notion of 
system goals. The Abernethy and Stoelwinder 
( 1991) system goal measure was included in 
this study as an indirect measure of the construct 
” Length and type of education was considered, but a number of researchers (Miller & Wagner, 1971; Kornhauser, 1962) 
argue that this represents the degree of socialization received by an individual prior to becoming an organization employee 
and thus does not necessary represent the role orientation of the individual. The three-item measure ofprofessional activity 
used by Hage & Aiken ( 1967) to represent organizational complexity was also considered. One of the items overlaps 
with the measure used in this study (publishing in professional journals), the second item measures membership in the 
organization and the third, attendance at professional meetings. These last two items were considered unlikely to represent 
a professional orientation as ail physician managers are required to be registered with their professional association and 
nearly all nurses belong to their professional association as it is their industrial union. There is also no reason to believe 
that attendance at meetings is an activity which represents an individuals role orientation. 
9 While the use of an alpha coefficient for assessment of reliability of this instrument may be questionable owing to the 
presence of two binary variables, additional support for the reliability of this instrument was obtained. First, the correlations 
between the sum of the tirst three items and each of the binary variables were significant at less than 0.001. Second, the 
sample was split based on the O/l response for each of the binary variables and the means compared for each group. In 
both cases, the means were significantly dllferent at less than the 0.001 level and in the direction predicted. 
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validity of the professional orientation measure. 
As expected, the correlation between an indivi- 
duals system goal orientation and professional 
orientation was negative and signiIicant ( -0.18, 
p = 0.05). Further suppport for the validity of 
the professional orientation construct was pro- 
vided by examining the relationship between 
an individual’s professional orientation and their 
attendance at management training courses 
developed and conducted within the hospital. 
It is not unreasonable to expect that those 
individuals with a high professional orienta- 
tion are likely to reject training programmes 
developed and conducted by those outside 
the profession. The point bi-serial correlation 
(Baggaley, 1964) between attendance at the 
hospital’s management training course and pro- 
fessional orientation was negative and significant 
(-0.33, p = 0.001). While the support for the 
measure is indirect, it does confirm our expecta- 
tions concerning characteristics of those with a 
high professional orientation, and thus adds 
some confidence to the validity of the construct. 
Control environment. Three questions were 
asked which attempted to capture the respon- 
dent’s perception of their control environment. 
For simplicity an individual’s environment has 
been classified as either an administrative 
control environment or a professional control 
environment. An administrative control environ- 
ment is one dominated by the use of output and 
behaviour controls and measured following 
Ouchi (1977) and Govindarajan & Fisher 
(1990). A professional control environment is 
one which emphasizes social and self-control 
processes. Respondents were asked to select, by 
ticking the appropriate box, which of the follow- 
ing statements best reflected their superior’s 
approach to them in managing their subunit. 
(a) Rather than focusing on the attainment 
of desired targets, my superior monitors my 
decisions and actions on an on-going basis. 
(b) My superior focuses on the attainment of 
set targets for my unit and allows me consider- 
able discretion in deciding the best way of 
achieving these targets. 
(c) Rather than specifying desired targets or 
monitoring my decisions and actions, my 
superior relies upon my professionalism to do 
the right thing by the hospital. 
The first two statements represent behaviour 
and output controls, respectively. The third 
statement represents professional control. The 
variable was treated as a categorical variable in 
the analysis. 
Dependent variables 
Role con$?ict. Role conflict was measured 
using the instrument developed by Rizzo et al. 
( 1970). The instrument has been tested widely 
in prior research and found to have high levels 
of validity and reliability (Schuler et al., 1977). 
An alpha coefficient (Cronbach, 195 1) of 0.84 
was derived in this study. 
Subunit performance. Following other re- 
searchers, performance was measured using a 
single global rating (Merchant, 1981; Chenhall 
& Brownell, 1988). Respondents were asked to 
rate their subunit performance from “well 
below average” to “well above average” on a 
fully anchored seven-point Likert-type scale. 
Although concern has been expressed regarding 
the use of self-reported measures of performance, 
there is no clear evidence that objective measures 
are either more reliable or valid in cross- 
sectional studies (Brownell & Dunk, 1991). 
The concern over self-ratings of performance 
may be heightened in this study as the research 
question centres on the problems which occur 
when professionals pursue goals which are 
inconsistent with those of the organization and 
thus the respondents may have rated their 
subunit performance high in such circumstances 
whereas others would not. lo There is, however, 
some evidence that such concern is not 
warranted. Abemethy & Stoelwinder ( 199 1 ), 
using a similar research setting, took precau- 
tionary steps to avoid this problem. They asked 
I” We wish to thank the reviewer who identified potential difficulties in using a self-rating performance measure in this 
particular study. 
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respondents to rate the importance superiors 
placed on a number of subunit performance 
criteria. Respondents were then asked to rate 
how superiors would have rated the subunit 
on each dimension. Abemethy & Stoelwinder 
( 199 1) also asked each subunit manager to rate 
the subunit performance using the measure 
employed in this study. If there were divergences 
between the criteria considered important by 
the superior and subordinate, one would not 
expect a significant correlation between the two 
measures. However, the correlation between 
the two measures was positive and significant 
(0.47, p C 0.001). While this study only 
included an overall global measure, the high 
correlation between the alternative measures 
used by Abernethy & Stoelwinder (1991) 
suggests that variability in superior’s and sub- 
ordinate’s expectations of subunit performance 
might not be a major concern in this study. 
Attempts were also made to use more 
objective measures of subunit performance by 
collection of superior ratings. However, both 
the director of medical services and director of 
nursing found it impossible to distinguish 
between the performance of 5 1 and 40 subunits, 
respectively. The medical director agreed to 
rate the best performers and worst performers. 
Fifteen of the physician-managed subunits were 
rated - nine were rated as top performers and 
six as poor performers. The respondents’ self- 
ratings were split at the mean and compared 
with the medical director’s ratings. Some con- 
vergence was evident. Of the eleven managers 
who rated their subunit performance high, 
seven of these managers were also rated as top 
performers by the medical director. 
Job satisfaction. This measure was based on 
the two-item scale developed by Dewar & 
Werbel ( 1979). The reliability of the instrument 
has been tested and compares favourably with 
that of other instruments measuring job satisfac- 
tion (Dewar & Werbel, 1979). Respondents 
were asked to indicate their agreement on the 
following two items: (a) all in all I am satisfied 
with my job; (b) in general I like working here. 
The scale was fully anchored with “one” 
representing strongly disagree and “seven” 
representing strongly agree. The two items were 
correlated at 0.77 (p = 0.000) and summed for 
use in the analysis. 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and correlation 
matrix for all variables are presented in Table 1. 
Hypothesis I 
To assess whether the match between pro- 
fessional orientation and the control environ- 
ment affects role conflict, the following model 
was used:” 
Y = a0 + blX, + bSzl + bqzz + 
b4XlXzl+ b&1X22, (1) 
where Y is role contlict, Xi is professional 
orientation, X2 1 is the type of control 
(1 = output control, 0 = either 
behaviour or professional control), and 
X2, is the type of control (1 = behaviour 
control, 0 = either output or professional 
control). 
The hypothesis was tested by examining the 
sign and significance of the coefficient of the 
two interaction terms b4 and b5 in equation ( 1). 
These coefficients capture the two-way inter- 
action between Xi and X2, and Xz2, respectively. 
Except for the b4 and b5 coefficients, the beta 
coefficients in equation ( 1) are not interpretable 
since they can be altered by shifting the origin 
points of Xi and X2, and X2, (see Southwood, 
1978; Allison, 1977; Govindarajan & Fisher, 
1990; Brownell & Dunk, 199 1). 
To assist in the interpretation of the results 
and to assess if the null hypothesis is rejected 
in a fashion consistent with expectations - i.e. 
that a professional form of control will have a 
’ ’ We would Lie to thank Professor Peter Brownell both for his suggestion that the model be specified so that differences 
between each form of control could be tested, and for his assistance in the specification of the model. 
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TABLE 1. Pearson correlation matrix (significance levels)’ and descriptive statistics 
Theoretical Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 range 
1. Professional orientation 7-3 1 7 31 18.79 5.85 
2. Type of control N/A l/2/3 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3. Role conflict 0.14 N/A B-56 8 55 28.41 11.1 
(0.09) 
4. Performance 0.11 N/A -0.44 l-7 1 7 5.69 1.21 
(ns) (0.000) 
5. Job satisfaction -0.21 N/A -0.51 0.22 2-14 2 14 lo.64 3.12 
(0.02) (0.000) (0.02) 
n = 91. 
l Pearson correlations (one-tailed test) were computed for all variables except the control variable as this is a categorical 
variable with three values. The significance levels for the correlations are in parentheses. 
more positive effect on reducing role conflict three control environments. To establish if the 
when individuals have a high professional coefficients are signiilcantly different in the 
orientation than when either output or behaviour three control environments (refer to equations 
controls are used - equation ( 1) can be (2-A)) it is necessary to look only at the t- 
decomposed, and three functions, one for each statistics provided for b4 and b5 in equation ( 1). 
control type, estimated, as follows:‘2 Inserting the coefficient estimates obtained 
For output controls (where behaviour/profes- from equation ( 1) (Table 2 ) into equations ( 2- 
sional controls are coded 0), equation ( 1) 4) provides the following coefficients for the X1 
becomes: variable: 
Y=(a+b2)+(bi+6&*. (2) 
For behaviour controls (where output/ 
professional controls are coded 0), equation 
( 1) becomes: 
For output control (equation (2)): 
Y = (27.73 - 18.36) + (- 0.04 + 0.88)X1. 
For behaviour control (equation (3)): 
Y = (27.73 - 5.96) + (- 0.04 + 0.03)X,. 
Y = (a + b3) + (bi + &)X1. (3) 
For professional control (where both behaviour 
and output controls are coded 0), equation ( 1) 
becomes: 
For professional control (equation (4) ): 
Y = 27.73 - 0.04X1. 
Y= u + &Xi. (4) 
To support the hypothesis we expected role 
conflict will be a significantly more positive 
function of professional orientation in both the 
output and behaviour control environment than 
in the professional control environment. Figure 
1 illustrates our expectations. To test the 
hypothesis we need, therefore, to assess if the 
slope coefficients ofX, differ signiIicantly in the 
The significance of the differences between 
the slope coefficients for X1 are given by the t- 
statistics for b* and b5 in Table 2. As indicated 
in the table, the b* coefficient is significant 
(p = 0.08) using a two-tailed test. This indicates 
that as professional orientation increases, the 
use of output controls is associated with 
significantly larger increases in role conflict 
compared with when professional control is in 
use. As the direction of the relationship was 
predicted it is not unreasonable to use a one- 
“This follows a similar decomposition employed by Brownell ( 1981) and Brownell & Merchant (1990). In this 
paper, however, the three types of controls require the use of two dummy variables and the decomposition of results 
in three separate functions, one for each control system type. 
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/ 
__/ Professional Control 
Environment 
LOW 
Professional Orientation 
High 
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of hypothesized 
relationship between type of control environment, 
professional orientation and role conflict. 
tailed test, thus enabling a rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no interaction between the 
control environment and professional orienta- 
tion affecting role conflict at a 95 per cent 
confidence level. As noted in Table 2, the b5 
coefficient is not significant and thus does not 
enable rejection of the null hypothesis with 
respect to the use of behaviour controls. 
Hypothesis II 
The hypothesis to test the impact of role 
conflict on both job satisfaction and subunit 
performance is tested by examining the Pearson 
correlation coefficients presented in Table 1. 
The correlations support our expectations and 
indicate that increases in role contlict result in 
a significant decrease in both job satisfaction 
( -0.5 1, p < 0.00 1) and subunit performance 
(-0.44, p< 0.001). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The organizational arrangements necessary to 
manage professionals in bureaucratic organiza- 
tions continues to be of interest to sociologists 
(Barley & Tolbert, 199 1). Attention is currently 
being drawn to this issue in the management 
and accounting literatures owing to the increas- 
ing trend towards “professionalizing bureau- 
cracies” and the pressure to impose even more 
sophisticated forms of administrative controls 
in these settings (Hopwood, 1984; Copur, 1990; 
Raelin, 1989; Preston et al., 1992). These 
concurrent trends create the milieu for conflict 
between the professional model of control and 
administrative control systems. There is con- 
cern in the literature that integrating professionals 
into bureaucratic organizations may not be 
effective when professionals, who wish to 
maintain their autonomy or are seeking to 
develop autonomy, confront formal administra- 
tive control systems which threaten this auto- 
nomy ( Copur, 1990; Aranya & Ferris, 1984). To 
date there has been no research which has 
TABLE 2. Regression results relating to the relationship between professional orientation, control environment and their 
interaction on role conflict (n = 91) 
Coefficient Value S.E. t Probability 
a 27.73 6.25 4.44 0.00 
6, -0.04 0.26 -0.15 0.88 
62 - 18.36 10.80 -1.70 0.09 
b, 5.96 12.59 0.47 0.64 
bq 0.89 0.50 1.75 0.08 
65 0.03 0.51 0.05 0.96 
R2 = 0.11, F = 2.20, significance of F = 0.06. 
Y= a, + b,X, + b&z, + b.&zz + bz&IXz, + bYY,Xz, (1) 
where Y is role conflict, X, is professional orientation, X,, is the type of control (1 = output control, 0 = either behaviour 
or professional control), and X,, is the type of control ( 1 = behaviour control, 0 = either output or professional control). 
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assessed how administrative controls, such as 
accounting, influence the relationship between 
professionals and bureaucracies. This paper 
attempted to do this by examining the effect of 
the interaction between professional orienta- 
tion and the control environment on role conflict 
and the subsequent impact on organizational 
outcomes. 
The results indicate that conflict between 
professional and bureaucratic norms and values 
is reduced when professionals with a high 
professional orientation do not operate in a 
control environment where output controls 
dominate and restrict them in their self- 
regulatory activities. These results are suppor- 
tive of prior literature (Hall, 1967; Aranya & 
Ferris, 1984; Organ & Greene, 1981; Derber & 
Schwartz, 1991). Further, the findings provide 
strong support that creating an environment 
which reduces role conflict has signit’icant and 
positive effects on an individual’s job satisfaction 
and overall subunit performance. 
It would appear from the findings that the 
type of control environment which individuals 
with a high professional orientation find most 
offensive is one dominated by output forms of 
control, that is, an environment where superiors 
Impose targets to be achieved and measure 
performance based on those targets. These 
findings are of particular relevance to manage- 
ment accountants as the primary form of output 
controls often involve the use of budgets and 
other financial targets. The results also have 
direct managerial and policy implications in 
hospitals and other human service industries 
where governments and third-party payers are 
creating pressure for the implementation of 
increasingly sophisticated management account- 
ing systems, primarily to control professional 
behaviour. In settings where individuals have a 
high professional orientation, these attempts 
will be less than successful. Not only will these 
controls not operate effectively, they are likely 
to have adverse individual and organizational 
effects. 
Since the results presented here indicate that 
it is the confluence of an individuals professional 
orientation and the control environment in 
which he/she works that creates adverse out- 
comes, management is faced with two options. 
First, it could attempt to reduce role conllict by 
implementing socialization and training policies 
to encourage professionals to forego some of 
the expectations of the professional role and 
accept the values and norms which underlie 
bureaucratic control systems. Caution, how- 
ever, is required in the implementation of this 
strategy as it may be counter-productive. There 
is concern that professionals will become 
proletarianized if internal socialization strate- 
gies reduce their professional orientation to the 
extent that they yield control of the content and 
context of their work to the bureaucracy. In 
other words, the very “soul” of the professional 
may be threatened (Derber & Schwartz, 1991, 
p. 89). They may “begin to resemble other 
workers in their job attitudes, satisfactions and 
discontents” (Copur, 1991, p. 115). One of the 
primary motives behind the push towards 
“professionalizing the bureaucracy” is to avoid 
and reduce such behaviour (Benveniste, 1987). 
The second option is to encourage individuals 
to maintain their professional orientation and 
allow them to act “in accordance with their 
professional judgement” and “rely on the informal 
controls associated with professional member- 
ship” (Aranya & Ferris, 1984, pp. 4-5). The 
contlict which often occurs when professionals 
are integrated into bureaucratic organizations is 
unlikely to occur under these conditions. The 
evidence indicates that it may be unnecessary 
to impose output forms of control as the use of 
professional control appears to have no adverse 
organizational consequences in this study. The 
results suggest that the creation of an appro- 
priate organizational culture where professional 
values and goals are recognized may actually 
facilitate the achievement of the organization’s 
goals. Indeed, professionals may perceive that 
the best way to achieve their own goals is 
through the achievement of organizational 
goals. 
While the findings in this study shed some 
light on control systems in professionally 
dominated organizations, it is necessary to 
recognize that models, such as the one studied 
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here, do not enable the complexities of manag- 
ing such organizations to be fully captured. For 
example, we were somewhat surprised to find 
that a behaviour control environment (i.e. one 
where the superior monitored the behaviour of 
the subordinate) did not result in increasing role 
conflict to any greater extent than in a profes- 
sional control environment. This result may 
reflect the fact that supervision is not perceived 
as an administrative control by this group of 
managers. The superiors of the respondents 
were, in every case, fellow professionals and, 
therefore, supervision may be perceived as 
originating from outside the organization and 
within the self-governing structure of the 
profession. If the authority for supervision of 
professional work comes from professional exper- 
tise, it is likely to be seen as an acceptable means 
of control (Blau, 1968; Freidson, 1975). 
The solution to the “control” problem in 
professionally dominated organizations such as 
hospitals is equally complex. Market approaches 
to public sector management are being imple- 
mented in a variety of countries. Large public 
hospitals such as the one studied here will need 
to manage both means and ends if they are to 
be price competitive or to deliver on the cost 
and quality targets specified in purchaser con- 
tracts. Some form of acceptable output control 
will need to be implemented. As professionals 
are key players in achieving these targets, it is 
unlikely that it will be feasible to buffer them 
from administrative forms of control. The 
challenge for hospital management will be to 
design management control systems which 
balance the competing demands of dominant 
professionals and those purchasing hospital 
services. 
Several limitations of the study should be 
noted. As with all cross-sectional survey studies, 
the results do not constitute proof of the 
relationships. Rather, the evidence presented 
can only be said to be consistent with the 
theoretical position developed in the paper. As 
the study was undertaken in only one organ- 
izational setting, further research is required to 
assess if these relationships hold in other similar 
organizations and in other settings where 
professional control is employed extensively. 
Several of the measures used in this study 
require further testing. While the variables of 
interest were measured using instruments pre- 
viously employed by other researchers, there 
are few studies which have used the Miller & 
Wager (1971) and Ouchi ( 1979) instruments. 
Further psychometric assessment of these instru- 
ments is required. Additional measures of 
performance, which could be externally veri- 
fied, might also enhance the measurement of 
performance. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this 
study does provide some insight into the 
nature of control processes in complex organ- 
izations dominated by professionals and illus- 
trates how the potentially conflicting control 
cultures associated with professionals and 
bureaucratic organizations can be effectively 
managed. 
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